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NSA review completed

**NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND**



**SECURITY MANAGEMENT LETTER**

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FOREIGN TRAVEL

1. Purpose. This Letter establishes Agency policy and procedures concerning official foreign travel (OFT) and unofficial foreign travel (UFT) for all personnel, including contractor personnel, under the security cognizance of NSA/CSS. This policy is based upon the need to protect Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) from possible compromise resulting from the capture, interrogation, exploitation, or entrapment of such personnel by hostile nations or groups.

2. Authority.

a. Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 1/20, "Security Policy Concerning Travel and Assignment of Personnel with Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information", effective 6 June 1978, states that persons granted authorization for access to certain categories of extremely sensitive information on foreign intelligence sources and methods of SCI incur a special security obligation and are to be alerted to risks associated with travel in or through certain countries, and defines such travel as hazardous activity.

b. Department of Defense Directive 5100.23, which prescribes certain administrative arrangements

This SML is unclassified, except for Annex A, which is CONFIDENTIAL.

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for the Agency, delegates authority to the Director, NSA to prescribe as a condition of employment that NSA employees ". . . must forego personal unofficial travel when the Director, NSA, determines that travel in the proposed area would constitute a hazard to national security."

c. NSA/CSS Regulation 120-10 directs that NSA/CSS personnel traveling abroad shall be informed of terrorist threats and instructed in procedures in effect for their protection.

### 3. Policy.

a. Persons designated in paragraph 1, above, may participate in foreign travel subject to the provisions of DCID 1/20 and this Letter. When UFT constitutes hazardous activity, as discussed below, individuals may be required to forego such travel.

b. Travel in or through the countries listed in Annex A, without official approval, may result in the withdrawal of clearance for continued access to SCI or appropriate disciplinary action up to and including removal from employment or assignment at NSA/CSS.

c. For areas not designated by higher authority, The Director of Security will determine, on a case by case basis, whether travel to areas of incipient unrest or other areas experiencing similar conditions constitutes a hazardous activity.

d. All persons traveling in or through foreign countries/areas shall be afforded defensive security briefings as deemed appropriate by the Office of Security.

### 4. Definitions.

a. Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). The term SCI means all information and material requiring special controls for restricted handling within compartmented foreign intelligence systems. The term does not include Restricted Data as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

b. Hazardous Activities. Hazardous activities include travel in or through countries listed in Annex A, or to countries where the traveler cannot reasonably be protected from capture, entrapment, interrogation or exploitation by hostile nations or groups. Hazardous activities also include assignment or travel in or through combat zones, areas where hostilities are taking place, or isolated or exposed areas where individuals cannot reasonably be protected against hostile action.

c. Hazardous Activity Group (HAG). As used in this Letter, a HAG is a formal designation of a period of time during which an NSA/CSS person has a special obligation, i.e., restrictions on foreign travel, due to current knowledge of SCI, foreign intelligence sources and methods or cryptologic techniques.

d. Defense Security Briefings . Defense security briefings are formal advisories which alert traveling personnel to the potential for harassment, provocation, or entrapment. These briefings are based on actual experience when available, and include information on courses of action helpful in mitigating adverse security and personal consequences. They also serve to alert personnel to what may be expected in the way of attempts to force or trick them to divulge classified information if captured or detained and of suggested courses such as advance preparation of innocuous, alternative explanations of duties and background.

## 5. Applicability.

a. Employees, Experts, Consultants and Contractors. At the time of indoctrination for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information, each person affirms in writing (viz, the NSA Security Agreement) an acceptance of the restrictions that may be placed on foreign travel, as well as the requirement to consult with Security (M5) or other designated Agency officials prior to any foreign travel while in an indoctrinated status or for a specific period after debriefing.

b. Military Assignees. Military personnel who are assigned or detailed to the NSA/CSS will abide by the policy stated herein, in addition to any requirements placed on the assignees by their parent service.

c. Dependents. Each Agency member is expected to be mindful of the reality of hostile intelligence service operations directed against selected U.S. visitors abroad, particularly in those countries listed in Annex A. Active programs of harassment, provocation, entrapment and coercion are employed to exploit these individuals. Dependents of U.S. intelligence personnel are likely to be singled out as desirable targets and can become involved in hostage situations or used as instruments to effect compromises. Agency members should therefore consider carefully the possible hazards to dependents who contemplate travel to the countries listed in Annex A, or others where, from time to time, similar conditions may exist. Normally, Agency members should discourage their dependents from such travel in the best interest of the individual and the national security. Under special circumstances, which include the use of guided tours sponsored by private organizations not affiliated with the Agency, travel to some locations listed in Annex A, including East Berlin,

may be acceptable for dependents. In such cases, the advice of the appropriate Security Officer or the Chief of the NSA/CSS Field Element should be sought.

6. Approval Authorities.

a. Only the Director or Deputy Director may approve:

(1) OFT of indoctrinated personnel with a HAG of P to areas designated in Annex A and West Berlin.

(2) UFT by indoctrinated personnel to areas designated in Annex A, or similar areas.

(3) UFT by indoctrinated or formerly indoctrinated personnel with a HAG of P to West Berlin.

(4) UFT by formerly indoctrinated personnel with a HAG of P to areas designated in Annex A, or similar areas.

b. The Deputy Director for Administration (DDA) or a designee is delegated authority to approve:

(1) OFT of indoctrinated personnel with a HAG of less than P to areas designated in Annex A.

(2) UFT by formerly indoctrinated personnel with less than a HAG of P to areas designated in Annex A, or similar areas, or West Berlin.

(3) UFT by currently indoctrinated personnel with less than a HAG of P to West Berlin.

c. Chiefs of Key Components are delegated authority to approve OFT to West Berlin.

d. Except as described in subparagraphs a and b, above, Chiefs of NSA/CSS Field Elements or their designees are delegated authority to approve UFT by all assigned personnel and other personnel within their geographic or administrative areas of responsibilities, including detached service personnel (as specified in applicable Terms of Reference under USSID 512), to any area other than those areas/countries listed in Annex A. Endorsement of Chief, NCEUR may be sought as necessary for UFT to West Berlin.

(NOTE: When the Chief of a Field Element questions the propriety of travel into an area of incipient unrest or an area experiencing similar conditions due to political, military or social instability, guidance will be sought from the Director of Security.)

e. Except as described in paragraphs a and b, above, the Chief, M5 or a designee is delegated authority to approve:

(1) OFT by all indoctrinated personnel to any area other than to areas/countries designated in Annex A or West Berlin.

(2) UFT by all indoctrinated personnel employed, assigned or detailed to the NSA/CSS and all other personnel under the security cognizance of NSA/CSS.

7. Mode of Travel. Carriers (air, sea, land) of U.S. or non-communist controlled countries must be used and the travel must be via internationally recognized routes which do not include normal stops, landings, or transit through those countries/areas listed in Annex A or similar areas (except for flights to West Berlin and over Cuba when on recognized corridor routes). ~~Unofficial foreign travel on foreign flag carriers must be reported to M56.~~ Travel aboard carriers of communist controlled countries, to include cruises originating from ports within the U.S., its territories and possessions, is prohibited.

8. Briefings.

a. Defensive Security Briefing. Each traveler must obtain a defensive security briefing prior to travel in or through foreign countries, other than those identified in paragraph 15c below. Travelers to areas listed in Annex A and Annex B and certain other areas as may be appropriate shall receive additional briefings germane to that area/country.

b. Post Travel Debriefing. On completion of the travel, the security authority may debrief the traveler on such matters as conditions in area visited, travel and security arrangements, harassments or other difficulties experienced during the travel.

9. Passports. NSA/CSS travelers will familiarize themselves with U.S. State Department regulations regarding use and safeguarding of passports. Applicants for official passports and visas must contact L233 at least 45 days in advance of travel. Non-official passports must be obtained individually by the traveler through U.S. State Department. Applications may be submitted at selected U.S. Post Offices and should be submitted at an early date.

10. Anonymity. In order to protect NSA/CSS persons against possible foreign intelligence or terrorist acts and to maintain the visibility of NSA/CSS activities world-wide

at levels commensurate with their sensitivity, NSA travelers will make every effort to avoid unnecessary identification with NSA/CSS and the U.S. Intelligence Community. OFT will be accomplished in accordance with NSA/CSS Regulation 21-5, "The NSA Anonymity Program". Travelers performing UFT are encouraged to make travel arrangements through groups/organizations not identifiable with NSA/CSS.

11. Official Foreign Travel (OFT). In addition to the requirements of this Letter, the planning, approval and performance of OFT will be in accordance with NSA/CSSPM 30-2, Series 700, "Travel Regulations".

12. Planning Unofficial Foreign Travel (UFT). Individuals should consider the following prior to submitting their UFT plans for approval.

a. Prior to requesting UFT approval, individuals should contact Security Awareness (M56) or the cognizant NSA/CSS Field Element Security Officer to insure that the locations to be visited are not proscribed or areas of current unrest. A list of areas/countries, over and above those shown in Annex A, where the situation (albeit temporary) is, or may very likely be such that UFT to such areas/countries could constitute a hazardous activity and thus may be prohibited, will be established by M56. This list, with appropriate additions and deletions, will be maintained on as timely a basis as possible and will be distributed to Chiefs of NSA/CSS Field Elements. However, since these situations are very fluid, and could develop rapidly, there may be unavoidable delays between the time a situation begins to develop and the time a particular area or country is added to the list. Consequently, M56 should be contacted before firm travel plans are made if there is any doubt about the political, military or social stability of a particular area/country.

b. Reservations and Cancellations. Personnel should not make advance deposits/reservations prior to receiving approval for proposed UFT, particularly if the UFT is to a country/area cited in Annex A or one of incipient unrest. Further, should local conditions in any country to be visited change and require cancellations of the travel, personnel must be prepared to absorb any losses from deposits/reservations that are not refundable.

13. Submission of UFT Requests. All requests for approval of planned UFT should be submitted as follows:

a. Civilian and military personnel serving at the NSA/CSS Headquarters complex. Submit Form K2579, "Unofficial

Foreign Travel Request", to M56 as soon as possible, but at least 30 working days prior to any planned UFT outside the U.S. and its territories and possessions, except as stated in paragraph 15.c., below.

b. Personnel assigned to or served by NSA/CSS Field Elements. Submit requests to the Chief of the Field Element or a designee in accordance with the Field Element administrative procedures. All requests for travel to areas designated in Annex A, or others where, from time to time, similar conditions may exist, will be forwarded to M5, along with the recommendation of the Chief of the Field Element.

c. Experts, consultants and contractor personnel. Submit a letter or Form K2579, "Unofficial Foreign Travel Request", to M56 as soon as possible, but at least 30 working days prior to planned foreign travel.

d. Former civilian employees, experts, consultants and contractors. During period of HAG assignment, submit a letter or Form K9069, "Notification of Foreign Travel", to M56 30 working days in advance of intended foreign travel.

e. Dependents. Indoctrinated personnel are required to report proposed foreign travel of their dependents to areas included in Annex A and Annex B or to other areas where, from time to time, similar conditions may exist, by message, letter or Forms K2579/K9069 to M56 or the Chief of the Field Element.

14. Evaluation of UFT Requests. The following are taken into consideration when evaluating requests for UFT:

a. National, Departmental and Agency policy.

b. Local conditions. Information from intelligence and security organizations, area military commanders or Field Elements, and the local American Embassy as appropriate, is reviewed to determine whether a threat exists to the safety and security of individuals or to the sensitive compartmented information of which they have knowledge.

c. Evaluation of the nature and sensitivity of the individual's access.

d. Proposed itinerary to include geographic location to be visited and mode of travel.

15. Exceptions.

a. Requests for exceptions or waivers to this foreign travel policy regarding currently indoctrinated

personnel will be referred to the Director or Deputy Director through M5.

b. Requests for exceptions or waivers to this foreign travel policy regarding formerly indoctrinated personnel will be considered on a case-by-case basis by DDA and may be referred to the Director or Deputy Director where necessary.

c. Provided that approved travel modes are used, as reflected in paragraph 7, UFT to Canada, Bermuda, the Bahamas or the border areas of Mexico need not be reported unless some unusual or special circumstance is associated with the travel; e.g., personal involvement with foreign nationals, difficulties with local police or governmental authorities.

d. Special provisions concerning foreign travel to West Berlin and East Berlin are contained in Annex B of this Letter.

16. Recission. This Letter rescinds SML Number VIII-5-1979, dated 24 September 1979 and Change Number 1, dated 17 March 1980.



LOUIS J. BONANNI  
Deputy Director  
for  
Administration

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Annex A  
Annex B

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ANNEX B

UNOFFICIAL FOREIGN TRAVEL (UFT) TO BERLIN

1. Travel to West Berlin, when authorized, is subject to the following provisions:

a. Travel by individuals assigned a "P" HAG must be by U.S. approved routes on military train, military aircraft, diplomatic transport or U.S. commercial aircraft on a non-stop flight scheduled to terminate in West Berlin, employing weather alternates in non-bloc countries.

b. Travel by individuals assigned less than a "P" HAG may be by any of the means described in 1.a., above, or by British or French commercial aircraft authorized to fly to West Berlin.

c. Except as provided in paragraph 2, below, travel by personal or rental automobile is prohibited.

d. All individuals, including dependents, shall be briefed prior to departure to West Berlin regarding personal safety, personal conduct, local commercial travel in West Berlin and points of contact in the event of problems. Dependent travel to West Berlin must be reported as required in paragraph 13.e.

e. If travel to West Berlin is as part of an organized tour, the tour must be sponsored by an entity outside the NSA/CSS family (e.g. American Express, University of Maryland, Knights of Columbus, military service group) and should not be composed of solely NSA/CSS personnel.

f. Travel arrangements for overseas Field Element individuals must be approved by the Chief of the Field Element, who may seek the endorsement of Chief, NCEUR, as necessary.

2. Exceptions on Use of POV for Individuals Assigned to West Berlin:

a. NSA/CSS personnel (other than those assigned a "P" HAG) and their dependents assigned to West Berlin may travel in PCS, TDY or UFT status by POV on the Berlin/Helmstedt Autobahn, subject to approval on a case-by-case basis by Chief, NCEUR.

b. Persons approved for travel by POV must comply with procedures for travel on the Berlin/Helmstedt Autobahn set forth in USAREUR Regulation 550-180 and with other security procedures established by Chief, NCEUR, to include a thorough briefing on autobahn travel.

c. Personnel approved for travel by POV shall not carry classified material on the autobahn under any circumstances.

3. Travel to East Berlin: Travel to East Berlin by NSA/CSS personnel is prohibited under any circumstances. While travel of dependents to dangerous areas is normally discouraged, dependents of NSA/CSS personnel should not be discouraged from travel to East Berlin if organized guided tours will be used for such travel.